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ScienceDirectThe scale of the international efforts to sequence SARS-CoV-2
genomes is unprecedented. Early availability of genomes
allowed rapid characterisation of the virus, thus kickstarting
many highly successful vaccine development programmes.
Worldwide genomic resources have provided a good
understanding of the pandemic, supported close monitoring of
the emergence of viral genomic diversity and pinpointed those
sites to prioritise for functional characterisation. Continued
genomic surveillance of global viral populations will be crucial
to inform the timing of vaccine updates so as to pre-empt the
spread of immune escape lineages. While genome sequencing
has provided us with an exceptionally powerful tool to monitor
the evolution of SARS-CoV-2, there is room for further
improvements in particular in the form of less heterogeneous
global surveillance and tools to rapidly identify concerning viral
lineages.
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Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has shone a spotlight on the
value of large-scale, open, and near real-time genomic
surveillance of pathogens. The first whole genome
sequences of Severe Acute Respiratory Coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2) were available within ten days after a
cluster of cases of pneumonia in Wuhan, China was
reported to the World Health Organisation (WHO) on
the 31st December 2019. Eighteen months later, close to
two million SARS-CoV-2 genomes have been made
available. This resource offers unprecedented opportu-
nities to monitor the emergence of viral genomic diversityCurrent Opinion in Virology 2021, 50:40–48 and to reconstruct transmission routes as SARS-CoV-2
continues to adapt to its human host.
COVID-19 is arguably the first post-genomic pandemic.
By the time the WHO officially declared the pandemic on
the 11th of March 2020 over 500 whole genome
sequences had been shared spanning 39 countries and
six continents. To place this in perspective, an analysis
published shortly after the declaration of the H1N1pdm
influenza pandemic in late April 2009, comprised only
11 partial hemagglutinin (HA) sequences [1]. More
recently, close to real time surveillance efforts have come
to the fore in the reconstruction of transmission of Zika
and Ebola, aided by portable sequencing devices [2,3],
though these remain relatively limited in the number of
genomes sequenced. Influenza genomic surveillance,
which represents a cornerstone of the biannual assess-
ment of the multivalent flu vaccines, has led to the
generation of close to a million genome sequences over
the last 30 years (Figure 1). Though, this number has
been overtaken by the ongoing sequencing effort for
SARS-CoV-2 within 18 months with 2 million genomes
available by the end of June 2021, and rising. Active
monitoring of viral evolution has become, and will likely
remain, a mainstay of pandemic response, both for
COVID-19 and for future epidemics.
Tracking the emergence of genomic diversity
Early observations
The rapid description of the first SARS-CoV-2 genome on
the 10th of January 2020 was vital to identify the previ-
ously unknown coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and repre-
sented the first step towards vaccine development and
genome sequencing initiatives [4,5]. Genomes
uploaded over the first few months of 2020 facilitated
initial assessments of the evolutionary rate of SARS-CoV-
2, of approximately 2 mutations per month. This rate is
suggestive of a most recent common ancestor of sampled
pandemic lineages to the latter portion of 2019 [6,7,8],
and a rapid spread to Europe, as confirmed by SARS-CoV-
2 positive wastewater samples from Northern Italy dating
to December 2019 [9].
Lineage dynamics
Several studies early in the pandemic identified multiple
independent introductions into regions of the world dur-
ing early 2020 [10,11–14]. For example, the first epi-
demic wave in the UK was seeded by well over 1000 inde-
pendent SARS-CoV-2 introductions [10]. As a result of
this extensive global spread, the worldwide SARS-CoV-2www.sciencedirect.com






























1990 2000 2010 2020
Current Opinion in Virology
Cumulative number of genome submissions to NCBI virus for major human viral pathogens for which genomic surveillance has been deployed.
Data for SARS-CoV-2 is obtained from the GISAID data sharing repository. Y-axis provides the log10(cumulative number of genomes) and the x-
axis provides the date of sample collection spanning from 1982 until the time of writing (June 2021). Lines are smoothed based on observations
per year.population first remained geographically largely unstruc-
tured with the same major cosmopolitan lineages found in
most regions of the world. The introduction of travel-bans
and regional restrictions in early 2020 led to the emer-
gence of more geographically associated lineages, though
not precluding the capacity for introduced lineages to
have marked impacts on local lineage frequencies [15].
Ongoing tracing of SARS-CoV-2 over the course of the
COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted striking dynamics
(Figure 2), with major clades changing markedly in fre-
quency through time.
At the finer-scale, identification of SARS-CoV-2 lineages
supports reconstruction of local chains of transmission
though can be complicated by factors such as inter-indi-
vidual variability in the SARS-CoV-2 incubation periods,
asymptomatic cases, and missing transmission nodes.
Reconstruction of transmission chains can be challenging
in the presence of high community infection levels and/or
multiple introduction events. Nonetheless, genomic anal-
ysis of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks has helped to identify
unanticipated sources of transmission and to rule out
transmission events suspected on the basis of forwww.sciencedirect.com example, traditional contact tracing or movement data
[13,16,17].
Genomics infrastructure
GISAID [18,19] is an instrumental platform for SARS-
CoV-2 genome sharing, supporting appropriate accredita-
tion of data providers, a tenet central to the data sharing
model. This resource has supported several initiatives
allowing visualisation and mutation characterisation
including NextStrain [20], CoVizu [21], cov-lineages.
org [22], outbreak.info (https://outbreak.info/) and CoV-
ariants (https://covariants.org). In addition, large-scale
assessment of phylogenies is greatly aided by the GISAID
Audacity workflow which provides readily updated phy-
logenies across high-quality genome submissions. How-
ever, there is a growing shortfall in methods that can
tractably keep pace with expanding datasets (Figure 1),
potentially posing a major bottleneck to continued efforts
to track diversity [23]. In part this is because standard
phylogenetic pipelines were not designed for datasets as
large, intensively sampled and with the low genetic
diversity characteristic of SARS-CoV-2 genomic studies.
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(a) Daily counts of genome assemblies (y-axis) shared on GISAID (current to 5/7/2021) over the course of the pandemic for all NextStrain clades.
Note 20I (Alpha, V1) is broadly equivalent to PANGO lineage B.1.1.7, 20H (Beta, V2) to B.1.351, 20J (Gamma, V3) to P.1. and 21A (Delta) to
B.1.617.2. (b) Equivalent plots as (a) split on each SARS-CoV-2 clade providing the daily proportions (y-axis) of genome submissions. Colour
assignments for each clade are given as per the legend at bottom right.
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Insights from pandemic-scale genomics van Dorp et al. 43approach for certain questions, but not fully satisfactory
for mutation tracking efforts. In particular, recurrent
convergent mutations are an important feature of con-
cerning variants (Figure 3), hence considering all inde-
pendent emergences over large-scale phylogenies is vital
to assess the impact of mutations in different spatiotem-
poral contexts [24,25].
Methodological advances to circumvent these challenges
have included rapid maximum parsimony placement of
new genomes onto existing tree topologies [26] and





Major mutations of interest along the SARS-CoV-2 genome. Line markers p
highlighting spike mutations. VoCs (defined current to May 2021) are highlig
deletion;▪ SNP), demonstrating striking patterns of convergent evolution. 
VoC. Major Variants of Interest (VoIs) at the time of writing include B.1.427 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; S:L452R). B.1.526 (first 
detected in Brazil; S:E484K), P.3 (first detected in the Philippines; S:E484K 
del69/70, S:del144/145, S:E484K) and B.1.617.1 and B.1.617.3 (detected in
density distribution of the count of recurrent mutations, over a 200-nucleotid
the number of estimated emergences based on a curated phylogeny of 550
www.sciencedirect.com phylogenetic reconstruction [8]. Additionally, there has
been a need to devise a nomenclature to characterise
emerging diversity, with the PANGO lineage assignment
tool having become a mainstay in genomic epidemiology
studies of SARS-CoV-2 [22]. Other efforts have focused
on defining wider phylogenetic ‘clades’ with both
GISAID [18,19] and NextStrain [20] providing schemes
(Figure 2). The WHO have also established a nomencla-
ture system, based around letters of the Greek alphabet,
to aid public discussion of concerning variants (https://
www.who.int/en/activities/tracking-SARS-CoV-2-
variants/, Accessed 5/7/2021).Current Opinion in Virology
rovide placement of mutations discussed in the text with the zoom box
hted for their carriage of major discussed mutations and deletions (*
Note Public Health England additionally classify Alpha + E484K as a
and B.1.429 (first detected in California and initially classified as VoCs
detected in New York; S:E484K + NSP6:del3675/3677), P.2 (first
+ S:N501Y), B.1.525 (detected in UK/Nigeria; NSP6:del3675/3677, S:
 India; S:452R, SE484Q, P681R). The bottom panel provides the
e sliding window, in the SARS-CoV-2 genome. The y-axis provides
,743 sequences dating to April 2021 [25].
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Box 1 Quantifying the impact of viral evolution on host
immunity
There is concern over the extent to which previously SARS-CoV-2
exposed, or vaccinated individuals could be (re-)infected by emer-
gent variants. High levels of humoral immunity (high antibody titres)
are associated with protection from reinfection in animal models and
studies of frequently re-exposed health-care workers [68,69]. Animal,
human challenge or natural evidence of reinfection [70] provide more
definitive answers on the ability of a lineage or clusters of mutations
to evade the total (cellular and innate) immune response of the host;
but these are slow, and may only provide useful data long after a new
lineage has spread. As SARS-CoV-2 diversity increases, there is a
need to rapidly test the putative immune escape phenotype of new
viral mutants.
Neutralisation assays provide an ex-vivo method of screening for
SARS-CoV-2 variants with the potential to escape humoral immune
responses and can be performed with live or spike-pseudotyped
virus, which have similar assay characteristics [71]. Following iden-
tification, new mutations within the spike protein can be engineered
into a pseudotyped viral vector system or SARS-CoV-2 backbone.
Pseudotyped spike mutants or viral isolates can then be incubated
with heat-inactivated human serum at a range of serum dilutions and
used to infect cells, with infectivity and viral dissemination quantified.
Any variant with an increased ID50 value (i.e. more concentrated
serum is required to neutralise the virus by at least 50%) can be said
to show a degree of escape from humoral immunity.
Mutations within the RBD (including L452 and E484) are seen in a
number of lineages associated with reduced vaccine-derived anti-
body neutralisation sensitivity [72]. For example, E484K on the Alpha
variant background led to a sixfold decrease in neutralisation by
serum from recipients of two BNT162b2 doses [73]. Similarly, neu-
tralisation of live Beta-lineage virus was estimated to be threefold
lower compared to wild-type in vaccinated individuals. Naturally
infected, convalescent individuals in this study did not show such a
pronounced drop in antibody neutralisation, which might reflect
antibody responses to a broader range of epitopes (non-spike neu-
tralising and non-neutralising) in the latter [74].Adaptive changes
Initial adaptive mutations
Following a host jump into a new species, a viral pathogen
must adapt to the host cell machinery and avoid immune
defences to successfully persist and transmit. Over the first
nine months of the pandemic, the SARS-CoV-2 population
remained reasonably evolutionarily stable with the excep-
tionof the emergenceof spikeD614GinFebruary2020and
accompanying sites (nucleotides 241, 3037, 14408) [27].
Lineages carrying 614G now represent the majority of
sequence data (Figure 2), with this dominance likely also
aided by founder effects during the early pandemic spread
[28]. Further early described adaptive changes include
N439K, located in the spike Receptor Binding Domain
(RBD), which confers partial resistance to several neutral-
izing multiclonal antibodies and enhances binding to
human ACE2 receptors [29]. Spike mutation A222V,
largely associated with PANGO lineage B.1.177 (clade
20E EU1), also rose markedly in frequency over the North-
ern hemisphere summer of 2020. However its adaptive
potential is debated, with its rapid growth in Europe
suggested to be due to seeding by travel associated infec-
tions rather than the mutation conferring an intrinsic trans-
mission advantage [15] (Figure 2).
Insights into the early stages of adaptation following a host
switch were also provided by subsequentSARS-CoV-2host
jumps into farmed minks [30]. Viral lineages circulating in
mink independently acquired a set of mutations including
spike Y453F [30,31], which is rarely observed in humans
(Figure 3). The combination of Y453F, spike del69/70,
I692V and M1229I defined ‘cluster 5’, a mink associated
lineage of SARS-CoV-2 which exhibited reduced antibody
neutralization [32,33], and jumped back into humans
before going extinct. Though, the role of mink farms as
animal reservoirs potentially fuelling transmission in the
human population prompted authorities in Denmark to
proceed with mass culling of minks.
Emergence of variants of concern
In late 2020 three distinct SARS-CoV-2 lineages emerged
almost concurrently in different continents. All have
spike mutation N501Y and came to attention due to their
unusual combination and number of mutations, together
with their detection coinciding with rapidly increasing
cases in regions where they were first linked to (Figure 3).
These include Alpha (B.1.1.7, clade 20I/501Y.v1) first
detected in the UK [34], Beta (B.1.351, 20H/501Y.v2)
in South Africa [35], and Gamma (P.1, 20J/501Y.v3) first
identified in cases linked to Brazil [36]. Each lineage
was elevated to the status of a Variant of Concern (VoC), a
term employed by public health agencies to define a
lineage with concerning epidemiological, immunological,
or pathogenic properties. These VoCs (henceforth 501Y
VoCs) were demonstrated to show enhanced receptor
binding [37–39] and increased transmissibility to varying
degrees [36,40] with B.1.1.7 the most transmissibleCurrent Opinion in Virology 2021, 50:40–48 501Y VoC in circulation [25]. Beta and Gamma addition-
ally demonstrated some ability to bypass immunity eli-
cited by prior infection or vaccination [33,41–45] (Box 1).
In addition, both Alpha and Gamma have been associated
with more virulent infections in some settings [46–48].
Around the same time period, two lineages were identi-
fied in California (B.1.427 and B.1.429; CAL.20C) coin-
ciding with a period of rapid pandemic growth [49]. These
lineages carry another RBD mutation L452R which is also
a hallmark of Delta (B.1.617.2) [50], ascribed as a VOC in
May 2021, which was linked to the epidemics in India
during the first half of 2021 and then rapidly rose to
dominance in the UK in May 2021 and subsequently
in many countries throughout the world (Figure 3).
Candidates and mechanisms
The appearance of similar mutations in diverse lineage
backbones provides an indication of convergent evolution
[6], with studies of 501Y VoCs supporting a marked
selective shift in the fitness of SARS-CoV-2 [25,51] (Fig-
ure 3). N501Y is a highly recurrent mutation which exhibits
increased binding affinity to human ACE2 receptors [38].www.sciencedirect.com
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to a conformation shift in the spike to favour an open state
[52], aiding viral entry into human cells. Other major
recurrent changes in the RBD include E484K which has
also been suggested to increase receptor binding, particu-
larly when in combination with N501Y [37]. E484K has
raised additional concern as it may significantly reduce both
convalescent and virus neutralisation by sera obtained from
convalescent and vaccinated individuals [53–55] (Box 1).
Similarly L452R confers resistance to monoclonal antibo-
dies [56] and partial escape of HLA-A24-mediated cellular
immunity, coupled with increased receptor binding rela-
tive to wildtype [57]. Of note, similar antigenic effects have
been suggested for changes at codon 417 (417N and 417T)
[55,58], though these mutations have conversely been
associated to a decrease in ACE2 binding [29,38]. Thus,
the relationship between receptor binding affinity and
transmissibility, including the effects when mutations
occur in combination, is likely to be complex.
Spike mutations falling outside of the RBD are also be of
adaptive importance. Indeed, changes at codon 681 are
suggested to enhance the efficiency of the furin cleavage
separating the S1 and S2 subunits [59]. Additionally, the
S1 N-terminal domain (NTD) shows a propensity for
recurrent deletions [60], some of which are found in
current VoCs (Alpha:del69/70,D144, Beta:del241/243;
Delta:del157/158). Deletions in the NTD may contribute
to altered antibody recognition [61,62] with genetic vari-
ation in this region also suggested as supporting confor-
mational changes in the spike protein [63,64], either
permitting or compensating for other changes in the
RBD, with which they are often associated.
While changes in the spike protein remain major candi-
dates in host adaptation, not least because of immuno-
dominance and the role in cell entry, the genome-wide
propensity for recurrent mutations in SARS-CoV-2 calls
for a broader perspective (Figure 3). For instance, all
aforementioned 501Y VoCs carry the same deletions at
amino acid positions 106–108 of NSP6, a region thought
to play an important role in innate immunity [65]. Other
major shared changes are observed in the nucleocapsid
protein, including widespread adjacent changes at codons
203205. Also within the nucleocapsid, the D3L ‘triple
mutation’ (deriving from 28280:GAT > CTA) has been
demonstrated to enhance subgenomic RNA expression in
Alpha [66] and computationally scored as enhancing
transmissibility [25]. Outside of the structural proteins,
deletions in ORF8 have also been implicated in altered
pathogenicity [67], with a truncated ORF8 observed in
Alpha and deletions identified in Delta (Figure 3).
Surveillance for future adaptive changes
Early detection
Early detection of concerning lineages is critical for
timely monitoring of viral transmission and deploymentwww.sciencedirect.com of appropriate interventions. This largely relies on the
completeness of the picture of the SARS-CoV-2 popula-
tion provided by genome sequencing. While some coun-
tries implemented close to real-time monitoring of SARS-
CoV-2 in their surveillance protocols, this is not feasible in
all settings. Alternatives to systematic patient-based sam-
pling, for instance environmental monitoring of waste-
water or sewage, may provide cost-effectiveness and a
wider picture of the circulating genomic diversity in one
given area [75]. Another possible strategy to circumvent
the challenge of achieving representative surveillance is
to focus on sequencing of incoming travellers and travel-
associated infections in high resource settings, as exem-
plified by Gamma which was identified in Japan in
individuals with a history of travel to Brazil [76].
Early detection of concerning lineages further relies on the
ability to identify them from their genomic make-up. This
is aided by flagging of mutations or combinations of muta-
tions that have been demonstrated to have a phenotypic
impact via functional studies (e.g. Box 1) or are suggested to
be relevant using more unsupervised methods (e.g. scans of
modified binding affinity [38] and/or mapping of escape
mutations [53]). However, not all mutations have been
assessed and such an approach ignores the possibility of
epistatic (i.e. non-linear) effects. Because of this phenom-
enon, mutations that are neutral or even deleterious in
isolation could provide a viral strain with a fitness increase
when combined in the same background. Strong epistatic
effects can lead to rugged adaptive landscapes, where
lineages can get stuck on local fitness peaks, unable to
cross the valleys towards higher ones. The emergence of
Alpha might have originated in the context of long-term
chronic infection, through a burst of mutations that allowed
it to reach a higherfitness peak, that may have been difficult
to attain through sequential accumulation of mutations in
immunocompetent hosts [34].
The epidemiological success of some lineages can also be
assessed more directly through growth rate estimates [28],
aided by independent observations in different epidemi-
ological settings, notwithstanding the challenging of
adjusting for highly unequal sampling. Growth rate esti-
mates must be carefully tested for confounders as initial
increases due to an adaptive advantage may be difficult to
disentangle from neutral processes which can also give
rise to marked lineage dynamics (Figure 2). Finally,
selection screens based on patterns of non-synonymous
and synonymous mutations [51] and homoplasy-based
metrics [25] may hold scope to predict the adaptive
potential of a variant based on its constituent mutations.
Ongoing evolution of SARS-CoV-2
The limited evidence for early adaptation detected in
SARS-CoV-2 suggests some degree of pre-existing adap-
tation to human infection, either through existing gener-
alist mechanisms of host evasion or because the earliestCurrent Opinion in Virology 2021, 50:40–48
46 Viral immunologylineages of SARS-CoV-2 had already acquired some key
mutations favouring transmissibility in humans by the
time the first sequences were generated. Nevertheless,
the emergence of VoCs with clearly higher transmissibil-
ity (Alpha, Delta) are obvious signatures of adaptation of
SARS-CoV-2 to its human host. The exact mechanisms
underlying increased transmissibility still remain poorly
quantified and many of the characteristic mutations
deemed as concerning (Figure 3) are also observed in
other lineage backgrounds, often well predating the
emergence of VoCs, and without apparent fitness effects.
Besides epistatic interactions between mutations, a fur-
ther complicating factor stems from the increasing rates of
immunisation due to vaccination and natural infection
which alters the immunological environment of the virus
as the pandemic progresses, thereby possibly modifying
the fitness effect of immune-escape mutations.
Virulence, defined as the disease-induced mortality rate for
infected hosts, is even more challenging to predict. While it
is sometimes assumed that viral pathogens systematically
become attenuated following a host jump, this is only
necessarily true for vertically (i.e. mother to child) inherited
pathogens. In the latter situation the fitness of the patho-
gens and the host are intimately correlated so that high
virulence would entail a fitness cost. Under horizontal
(epidemic) transmission, a pathogen can become more or
less lethal depending on the correlation between transmis-
sibility and virulence. For example, higher viral replication
rates can be favoured as long as they allow a lineage to
spread more easily, even if this entails a cost to the host.
Given the moderate host mortality and 50% of transmis-
sion being pre-symptomatic, the selective pressure on
SARS-CoV-2 to evolve towards intrinsic lower virulence
is expected to be weak. This being said, morbidity and
mortality are predicted to eventually plumet as an increas-
ing fraction of the population acquires some immunity
through vaccination and prior infection.
Likely the most significant aspect to pandemic manage-
ment is the degree of evolution of SARS-CoV-2 towards
altered antigenicity, the timescales and consistency of
which can be difficult to predict even for richly studied
viruses such as seasonal influenza. Concerns surrounding
waning immunity and escape variants have in part been
driven by studies of reinfection by other human seasonal
coronaviruses. Two major hypotheses could explain fre-
quent reinfections: rapidly waning host immunity; or path-
ogen antigenic evolution leading to immune escape. Neu-
tralisation assays (Box 1) provide support for the latter
hypothesis in alphacoronavirus 229E. Using serum col-
lected between 1985 and 1990, and a series of 229E spike
sequences sampled at eight-year intervals, Eguia et al.
showed that antigenic evolution over the course of a decade
led to almost complete escape from antibody neutralisation
after 8–17 years. This suggests that vaccines to SARS-CoV-
2 may need to be reformulated periodically, as circulatingCurrent Opinion in Virology 2021, 50:40–48 SARS-CoV-2 lineages evolve in response to host immunity
[77]. Vaccine escape, however, is rarely a binary pheno-
type and a gradual loss of antibody recognition through the
evolution of new viral strains is to be expected rather than
an instantaneous loss of efficacy. Moreover, cellular immu-
nity is still predicted to provide some protection against
most severe symptoms in many re-infections. Thus, while
updated vaccinations will be required at least for the most
at-risk, this should be a largely manageable challenge aided




monitoring the course of the COVID-19 pandemic and will
become a vital component supporting ongoing public
health, in particular informing on the vaccine update
schedule. There is little doubt that SARS-CoV-2 will
become an endemic circulating pathogen which will con-
tinue to undergo adaptation to human cellular and immune
defences. However, early identification of new variants,
coupled with a richer understanding of the mutational
forces underlying changing patterns of transmissibility,
virulence and antigenicity could reduce global morbidity
and mortality to a fraction of that experienced during the
pandemic phase of COVID-19. Additionally, the tremen-
dous progress and lessons learnt from fighting SARS-CoV-2
hold promise to reduce future threats to global health and
support preparedness for future epidemics.
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